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C O P Y

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.


December 22, 1952.

Honorable James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

DOE review
completed.

Dear Mr. Lay:

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. J. Patrick Coyne dated October 6, 1952, recording the President's direction, through you, that appropriate measures be undertaken immediately with respect to the following problem:



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Attached hereto are two copies of a report, with Mr. Coyne's memorandum attached as Appendix A, which has been prepared and approved by the following individuals, who were designated to undertake the study outlined therein in accordance with the President's direction: Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, G-2 of the Army, Office of Naval Intelligence and Office of Special Investigations; as well as special representatives of the Secretaries of State and Treasury. The assistance of Mr. Coyne to this special committee in the preparation of this report was constructive and appreciated.

Proper implementation of the countermeasures proposed in this report is dependent in some degree upon the dissemination of information contained therein to personnel of affected departments and agencies whose responsibilities necessitate their being informed of the contents of the report.



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the report in order to allow distribution on a strict need-to-know basis to personnel in the respective departments and agencies whose responsibilities clearly necessitate such access.

The report and the recommendations made therein are intended to be a broad guide in establishing controls in connection with this problem, and it is contemplated that efforts of the various departments and agencies will be intensified along these lines should the President authorize implementation thereof.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. Edgar Hoover

Attachments (2)

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December 4, 1952

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

ON

COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND
DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION
AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF DEMOLITION
ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

THE PROBLEM

Assuming Russian capability for clandestinely introducing and detonating in the United States in place demolition atomic weapons, what countermeasures are required to detect and defend against such introduction.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

The cheapest, easiest and most accurate form of delivery of atomic weapons is by hand. It is now technically possible to produce fission bombs of very high yield which are portable. These are capable of being manufactured in very small pieces, transported by hand or in personal hand luggage, and assembled by hand by nominally trained people in small quarters without elaborate equipment. Adequate protection against such introduction, assembly, placement and detonation does not presently exist.

To completely guard against the introduction of such weapons would require the establishment of a complete "Iron Curtain" in every sense of the word. The United States democratic form of Government, United States prestige, public opinion and costs in money and manpower combine to effectively prevent the establishment of such an "Iron Curtain."

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It is now technically feasible to design atomic weapons in such manner that they can be in very small parts capable of being transported by almost any means and clandestinely introduced. This is true not only of fissionable material but of other bomb components. There are, however, certain component parts which could be obtained in the United States commercially.

Fissionable material, the heart of the weapon, probably lends itself to discovery by technical means. The Atomic Energy Commission is presently investigating, under the highest priority, the technical means for detection of the fissionable material in connection with its clandestine introduction into this country. It is anticipated that development in the light of wider knowledge will result in some usable equipment. It is hoped that in four to six months the first usable technical devices for detection may be available for countermeasure use. The refinements considered desirable will take considerably longer.

This problem is of direct interest to many Government agencies, and it is apparent that attempts to meet this problem will of necessity be channeled along the following lines:

- a. Obtaining of reliable intelligence abroad as well as internally.
- b. Searches of persons arriving in the United States including the use of the technical devices developed by the Atomic Energy Commission.
- c. Searches of shipments arriving in the United States, including the use of the technical devices developed by the Atomic Energy Commission.
- d. The problem of detecting foreign-controlled fissionable bombs which may be in the United States or which may be introduced in spite of measures to prevent such introduction.

These four categories will be discussed separately below.

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DISCUSSION

1. INTELLIGENCE

The best insurance for intercepting clandestine introduction of fissionable material and the other component parts of an atomic bomb is to know in advance the details of efforts to be made for such introduction. This is, of course, an oversimplification of the obstacles involved in the obtaining of such information abroad but highlights urgent need for continued and greatly increased efforts to develop this type of intelligence at its source.

Additional insurance for the prevention of the use of the component parts of the bomb, should they actually be introduced into the United States, is adequate domestic intelligence concerning the people transporting the parts within the United States as well as the people receiving, assembling and using the bomb within the United States. In the light of the assumption that Russia has the capability for fabricating and clandestinely introducing bombs or components for assembling into bombs into the United States, there is the distinct possibility that fissionable material or assembled Russian bombs are presently in this country.

2. SEARCHES OF PERSONS, INCLUDING USE OF
TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT THAT MAY BE DEVELOPED

Persons arriving in the United States arrive legally or illegally. They will be discussed separately.

Persons Arriving Legally:

Persons arriving in the United States legally arrive by commercial or private air, sea or land transportation. Generally speaking, legal arrivals whether by ship, plane, train or automobile must pass through a small control point and would at that point be ideally located for a spot check with devices that the Atomic Energy Commission is hopeful of developing to determine whether they are carrying fissionable material and certain other component bomb parts.

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It is believed that at least initially the technical devices being pondered by the Atomic Energy Commission must of necessity be employed on a spot-check basis at as many ports of entry as is possible and that this search should be with an apparent haphazard but statistically controlled pattern. It has been noted that it will be more feasible and preferable that the check of the diplomatic personnel be of a surreptitious character. It may be determined to be advisable that certain diplomatic personnel entry be restricted to designated ports. This spot-check system will give at least some measure of control on the very great percentage of legal arrivals. It should be intensified as time and technical developments permit.

Cognizance has been taken as to whether such searches of individuals, especially those of a surreptitious character, would constitute an unreasonable search. If this question still exists at such time as the Atomic Energy Commission has completed its deliberations and development of technical detection devices, it is anticipated that an opinion of the Attorney General in this connection will be obtained by the interested agencies.

Persons Arriving Illegally:

The illegal entry of persons into the United States may be classified in the following categories:

- a. By use of false documents or misleading and false statements.
- b. Desertion of seamen.
- c. Stowaways.
- d. At places other than ports of entry, by land, sea or air.

Illegal entry provides a carrier for fissionable material. Apprehension presumes that a search will be made.

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The problem of the use of false documents is serious and has been the subject of Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security recommendations. Pertinent recommendations are being repeated herein.

The recently enacted Omnibus Immigration Act provides measures designed to cope with the problem of discharge of alien seamen in United States ports. While the Act does not prevent alien seamen from deserting once they have landed legally, it is contemplated that the measures outlined above for legal entries will apply for alien seamen.

The illegal entry of stowaways can be prevented only by an adequate search and patrol of vessels arriving in United States ports. This matter has been the subject of consideration by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and recommendations have been made in this connection. The recommendations are being repeated herein.

Illegal entries at other than ports of entry are made with little effort and to such an extent that a few persons engaged in the occupation of bringing aliens into the United States illegally by airplane have been apprehended and prosecuted. Others enter by sea and others with even less effort by land. Such a condition can only be improved through the utilization of additional personnel in the departments and agencies of the Government responsible for the prevention of such entries. This matter has been the subject of an Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security study and recommendations have been made. The recommendations are repeated herein.

3. SEARCH OF SHIPMENTS INTO THE UNITED STATES,
INCLUDING USE OF TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT THAT MAY
BE DEVELOPED BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Shipments arriving in the United States can be classified as follows:

- a. Express and freight shipments.
- b. Baggage.
- c. Mail.

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- d. Baggage and effects of foreign diplomatic representatives.
- e. Diplomatic pouches.
- f. Illegal through other than ports of entry.

Generally speaking, express and freight shipments, as well as baggage, are searched at least on a selective spot-check basis. The following major loopholes exist, however, in connection with examinations of freight and express shipments:

- a. Possibility of substitution and "switching" in connection with shipment in bond or for warehouse prior to Customs inspection.
- b. Possibility of concealment in certain types of shipments not examined at the appraisers' stores.
- c. Possibility of concealment in bulk shipments such as scrap iron, machinery, etc.

Examination of mail parcels is limited to those classes believed to contain articles which might be liable to Customs duties, those which are believed to contain prohibited or restricted articles and those from Soviet bloc countries.

Baggage and effects of foreign diplomatic representatives, as well as the foreign diplomatic pouches, are passed without examination.

The Bureau of Animal Industry maintains a patrol between points of entry along the southern border and, in addition to its normal work, assists the Customs Service in enforcement work. The Immigration Service maintains patrols which cooperate with Customs in the detection of smuggling attempts. The Immigration Service operates twelve planes on the southern border in an effort to prevent smuggling. It is apparent that planes are illegally crossing our borders and coasts and landing merchandise and aliens within our country.

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They could be carrying fissionable material and subversive individuals. Present air defense measures and Immigration and Naturalization Service efforts are not adequate to cope with this loophole in our security measures. The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security has made recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce regarding security control of non-military aircraft. The Secretary has advised that his department would be willing to share jointly with the Secretary of Defense the responsibility for establishing this program. This matter is presently receiving study by the Secretary of Defense.

Under the present port security program, Soviet and Satellite vessels are denied entry to certain major United States ports. However, a comprehensive port security program does not exist for all major ports. Whenever a vessel enters a major U.S. port from a foreign port, it is the responsibility of the Coast Guard to decide the proper security measures to be taken in the case of each ship. The lack of a satisfactory detection device for atomic weapons has hampered the coordinated Coast Guard-Bureau of Customs search and surveillance of "suspect" vessels.

Smuggling at points along the seacoasts, other than regular seaports of entry, can be very easily achieved by virtue of very limited United States countermeasures. Adequate beach patrols between ports of entry on our coasts would be required if satisfactory security is to be achieved regarding smuggling of atomic weapons or component parts thereof in these areas.

The situation is, therefore, that only spot-check or limited examinations are made of shipments, vessels, aircraft and vehicles arriving in the United States legally, and in addition illegal shipments are being accomplished through other than ports of entry.

It is apparent that the examinations presently being afforded shipments arriving in the United States are not adequate to effectively prevent the clandestine introduction

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into the country of bomb material. This is due in a large part to the lack of personnel, the lack of technical detection equipment and the lack of up-to-date information concerning fissionable material.

4. DETECTION OF FOREIGN-CONTROLLED
FISSIONABLE BOMBS IN THE UNITED STATES

The secondary defense, or detection of foreign-controlled fissionable bombs which may be in the United States or may be introduced at a later date, is a problem of serious nature. The bomb could be produced with a yield which would allow it to be secreted at a considerable distance from a highly important target, yet with sufficient strength to completely demolish it. A search of the entire area which would be covered by the explosion would be hampered by the involvement of private property that might lie within the effective radius of the bomb, the limitations on detection equipment, and the fact that the bomb being portable could be stored in one place and then deposited in the area by one individual shortly before the intended explosion. It is considered essential that all available information which would aid in the location or detection of such fissionable bombs be made available, on a need-to-know basis, in order that every effort can be made by the responsible agencies to detect such bombs. It is also considered essential that every avenue be explored by the Atomic Energy Commission, in the light of continuing technical developments, in an effort to develop some type of detection equipment which can be considered portable in the sense that it can be carried around an area, into the hold of a ship, etc.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Note: It is recognized by the committee that to accomplish the recommendations set forth below will require in most instances the expenditure of funds and an increase in personnel.

GENERAL

It is recommended that complete information in connection with this over-all problem be disseminated on a need-to-know basis in the various departments and agencies of the Government which have responsibilities in connection with the prevention of the introduction of these fissionable bombs, or their component parts, into the United States and to those agencies and departments which have responsibilities for finding any that may have been or may hereafter be introduced into the United States. This recommendation is made in view of the fact that information has been released publicly concerning the atomic artillery shells which have been developed, the fact that there have been articles in the press concerning the decrease in size of the atomic bomb, and the fact that there can be no successful countermeasures taken in connection with this problem unless those people responsible for the countermeasures are completely briefed.

TECHNICAL

It is recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission, in collaboration with the enforcement agencies, develop as rapidly as possible the required technical devices for use in detection of clandestine introduction of fissionable bombs or bomb material into the United States, whether by personal carrier or through shipment. There is always the danger, however, that the Russians will develop countermeasures to the U.S. detection devices, thus requiring continuous research in this field. It may be found necessary in the initial stages to furnish the equipment to enforcement agencies on a priority basis. This matter can be discussed at a later date if found necessary.

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INTELLIGENCE

1. It is recommended that the Central Intelligence Agency be instructed to continue and to expand to the greatest degree possible efforts to obtain information at its source or as close thereto as possible relating to any plans that might exist for the clandestine introduction of fissionable material into the United States.

2. It is recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the military intelligence services within their respective fields continue to infiltrate the subversive ranks in the United States, and through other means and sources, to insure that the United States Government will be aware of plans within this country for the receipt of fissionable material from abroad and the use thereof within the United States.

SEARCHES OF PERSONS

Persons Arriving Legally
In The United States

1. Inasmuch as it is now technically feasible to design fissionable material components for operational use transportable on the person, it is recommended that at least initially all persons arriving legally in the United States be subjected to a spot-check search for fissionable material utilizing the technical equipment which may be developed as a result of present studies being made by the Atomic Energy Commission. These spot-check searches should be intensified as technical developments permit.

2. Inasmuch as it is now technically possible to transport fissionable material components for operational use on the person, it is recommended that at least initially all diplomatic representatives arriving in the United States be subjected to a surreptitious spot-check search if technical equipment can be designed by the Atomic Energy Commission for the detection of fissionable material. These searches should be intensified as development of technical equipment permits. Consideration should be given at a later date to channeling diplomatic representatives and nationals of certain countries to designated ports of entry for checking.

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3. It is recommended that the Immigration and Naturalization Service and other agencies which have a direct interest be instructed to establish effective controls of legal but uncontrolled arrivals and that heavy penalties be imposed for violations of those controls.

(Note: The problem of excluding subversively inclined individuals from entry through the visa medium has been studied by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and recommendations have been made in connection therewith including extension of the advisory opinion procedure and a requirement for individual documentation of alien crewmen on ships and aircraft. The satisfactory implementation of these recommendations would assist materially in the exclusion of individuals who would logically be used as carriers of fissionable material.)

Persons Arriving In The
United States Illegally

1. The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security has recommended to the National Office of Vital Statistics, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, that efforts be made to obtain uniform legislation in the various states in so far as birth certificates are concerned. It is noted that the ease with which such certificates can be obtained in the United States is a major contributing factor to the use of false documents for the purpose of illegally gaining entrance into the United States. It is recommended that this matter be followed and pressed.

2. The recently enacted Omnibus Immigration Act provides measures designed to cope with the problem of discharge of alien seamen in United States ports. It is recommended that the enforcement of these provisions be strict and placed into effect as expeditiously as possible.

3. The question of the illegal entry of stowaways has been considered by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security which recommended as follows:

"That the force of Patrol Inspectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service be

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sufficiently augmented to provide for the stationing at all principal seaports of entry an adequate force of such officers to make a thorough search of arriving vessels for stowaways and to maintain a surveillance of vessels while in United States ports to prevent the landing of stowaways who have escaped detection upon arrival, and the landing of crew members who have been denied shore leave."

Every effort should be made to have these recommendations placed into effect at the earliest possible date.

4. The problem of illegal entries at other than ports of entry has been considered by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security which recommended as follows:

"That the force of Patrol Inspectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service be augmented to make possible a more effective patrol of our land borders and Gulf Coast to prevent the illegal entries of aliens at places other than designated ports of entry."

Until such patrol can be augmented, it will continue to be a relative easy matter for illegal entries to be made at places other than designated ports of entry. It is recommended that every effort be made to accomplish the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security in order that the danger from this glaring loophole in our security can at least be substantially diminished. (With regard to coastal areas, see Recommendation No. 7 below.)

SEARCH OF SHIPMENTS INTO THE UNITED STATES,
INCLUDING USE OF TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT BEING CONSIDERED
FOR DEVELOPMENT BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

1. It is recommended that the spot-check examinations of express and freight shipments arriving in the United States be intensified and further extended by the use of technical detection equipment being considered for

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development by the Atomic Energy Commission. It is recommended that the extension of these spot-check searches through the use of any technical detection equipment which can be developed be accomplished as rapidly as possible in the light of availability of the equipment. Shipment in bond, warehouse shipments, shipments not examined in appraisers' stores and bulk shipments should receive special consideration to insure that a high degree of security is reached in connection therewith at the earliest possible time.

2. It is recommended that the use of any technical detection equipment developed by the Atomic Energy Commission be added, as rapidly as circumstances permit, to the searches of baggage which are presently being made.

3. It is recommended that the spot-check examination of mail packages regardless of size be intensified. It is further recommended that the use of technical detection equipment being studied for development by the Atomic Energy Commission be extended to all mail packages regardless of size as rapidly as circumstances permit.

4. It is recommended that the baggage and effects of foreign diplomatic representatives be subjected to examination with the technical equipment being studied for production by the Atomic Energy Commission to determine whether fissionable material is contained therein. It is recommended that this be accomplished surreptitiously.

5. It is recommended that diplomatic pouches be subjected to examination with the technical detection equipment being considered by the Atomic Energy Commission. It is recommended that diplomatic couriers of at least the Soviet bloc nations be required to enter the United States at designated ports in order that they and the pouches they carry may be subjected to an examination by the technical detection equipment being developed. As in the case of diplomatic shipments, it is recommended that this examination be accomplished, at least initially, on a surreptitious basis.

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6. It is noted that the responsibility for searches of incoming shipments is the responsibility of the Customs Service. There is, however, a real problem involved in so far as the entry of illegal shipments between regular ports of entry is concerned. It has been noted above that the Patrol Inspectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as the Bureau of Animal Industry, cooperate with the Customs Service in its efforts to prevent illegal shipments into the United States between established ports of entry. It is recommended that these services continue and increase their close coordination and that appropriate personnel be added to these services for the purpose of detecting smuggling attempts between ports of entry as well as for the apprehension of aliens attempting to illegally enter the United States. It is believed that only through such coordination of effort and the addition of needed personnel will the country receive a marked degree of improvement in connection with the loopholes between points of entry which have existed to this time.

7. It is recommended that the port security program be reviewed by the President's Joint Navy Department-Treasury Department Committee for the purpose of determining its adequacy and appropriateness in the light of the assumption contained in the statement of the problem outlined above and the "Discussion" section of this report. This should include consideration of the possibility of extending the present program considerably as a result of the possible development by the Atomic Energy Commission of a satisfactory detection device. The Committee should immediately prepare and consider plans for the use as soon as possible and to the greatest extent possible of these devices in connection with the examination of ships and cargoes under the port security program, and also for the extension of the port security program to include the establishment and maintenance of adequate patrols by the Coast Guard to prevent smuggling of atomic weapons or their components along our seacoasts between ports of entry.

8. It is recommended that the necessary control of nonmilitary air traffic as outlined by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and presently receiving

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consideration by the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense be jointly undertaken by the Departments of Commerce and Defense at the earliest possible date.

DETECTION OF FOREIGN-CONTROLLED
FISSIONABLE BOMBS IN THE UNITED STATES

It has been recommended under "General" that all available information which would aid in the location and detection of the fissionable bombs be made available on a need-to-know basis to the personnel of the agencies which have the responsibility for such location and detection.

It has been recommended under "Technical" that every avenue be explored by the Atomic Energy Commission, in the light of continuing technical developments, to develop some type of detection equipment which can be considered "portable" in every sense of the word.

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Document No. _____
Review of this document by CIA has
determined that
☐ CIA has no objection to declass
☐ It contains information of CIA
interest that must remain
classified at TS S C
Authority: HR 70-2
☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest
Date _____ Reviewer _____

Copy No. 2A of 60, consisting of
fifteen pages, Table of Contents,
Appendix A, and a copy of transmittal letter.